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Abstract
We consider the issue of a market maker acting at the same time in the lit and dark pools of
an exchange. The exchange wishes to establish a suitable make-take fees policy to attract trans-
actions on its venues. We first solve the stochastic control problem of the market maker without
the intervention of the exchange. Then we derive the equations defining the optimal contract to
be set between the market maker and the exchange. This contract depends on the trading flows
generated by the market maker’s activity on the two venues. In both cases, we show existence
and uniqueness, in the viscosity sense, of the solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
associated to the market maker and exchange’s problems. We finally design deep reinforcement
learning algorithms enabling us to approximate efficiently the optimal controls of the market
maker and the optimal incentives to be provided by the exchange.
Keywords: Market making, dark pools, regulation, make-take fees, stochastic control, principal-
agent problem, deep reinforcement learning, actor-critic method
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work [1], a vast literature on optimal market making problems has emerged. A
market maker is a liquidity provider whose role is to post orders on the bid and ask sides of the limit
order book of an underlying asset. Various extensions of [1] have been considered, see for example
[7, 12] and the books [6, 11] for further references. In most of these works, it is assumed that there
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is no make-take fees system on the market. The problem of relevant make-take fees is studied quan-
titatively in [3, 10]. In these papers, the policies are designed in the context of traditional liquidity
venues, or so-called “lit pools”. On these venues, the order book is visible to market participants,
and transactions are fully transparent. Market takers can in particular monitor the quotes offered by
market makers.
However, recent regulatory changes have induced a rise of different types of alternative trading mech-
anisms, notably “dark pools”, which have gained a significant market share. Nowadays, many major
exchanges, such as Bats-ChiX and Turquoise, have their dark pools in addition to their major trad-
ing platforms. Furthermore, several traditional exchanges such as NYSE and Euronext offer trading
platforms whose functioning is inspired mainly by dark pools. Trading rules for dark pools are very
diversified, but they share at least two important properties. The first one is the absence of a visible
order book for market participants, which implies that investors have no information on the amount
of liquidity posted by market makers. Second, aiming at improving prices for clients compared to
the lit venue, dark pools usually set prices that are different from those in the lit pool. For example,
many dark pools take the mid-price of the lit pool as their transaction price. Because of these two
effects, it is presumed that trades in dark pools have no or less price impact.1 This feature enables
market makers to mitigate their inventory risk. Finally, a remarkable phenomenon is that dark pools
are prone to a latency effect: the price being monitored in the lit pool can change between the time of
a request in the dark pool and that of the corresponding transaction. Such price discrepancy due to
latency is particularly frequent in the presence of high imbalance because the price is likely to move
when liquidity is scarce on one side of the book.
As the market impact of trades on a dark pool is less important or delayed, market makers can also
use it to liquidate large positions. Therefore there is a trade-off between transacting in the dark pool
at a lousy price with low impact or in the lit pool at a better price with higher impact. Dark pools
are also very attractive for market takers because of the reduced market impact and the possibility
to be executed at a better price than in the lit pool.
To our knowledge, most of studies treat the issue of trading in dark pools mainly from the point of
view of optimal liquidation: a trader wishing to buy or sell a large number of shares of one or several
stocks and needing to find an optimal order placement strategy between the lit and dark pools, see
for example [15]. In this paper, we rather focus on the behavior of a market maker, acting on both lit
and dark venues. In the lit market, we assume that there is an efficient price St and that the market
maker always posts volumes on the bid and ask sides at prices St+
T
2
and St−
T
2
, where T
2
represents
the half-tick of the market.2 The market maker also provides liquidity in the dark pool where the
transaction price is the efficient price St (possibly with the latency effect). This can partially be seen
as the dual problem of [10], without dark pools, where the posted volume is fixed at one unit, and the
market maker optimizes the quoted spread. In addition to market impact and latency phenomena,
we also take into account transaction costs for market orders on both venues, which can be smaller in
the dark pool. Thus, in our setting, a single market maker only needs to select the volumes to post
on the bid and ask sides of both lit and dark pools.
1Note however, that transactions’ reporting imposed by regulation in most markets may still induce some delayed
price impact.
2We have in mind here a large tick asset for which the spread equals the tick size.
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An exchange managing the lit and dark venues wishes to attract transactions. Inspired by the
work [10], we consider that the exchange offers a contract to the market maker whose remunera-
tion at a terminal time is determined according to the executed transactions on both venues. This
is a so-called principal-agent framework, first formalized in [8, 9, 17]. Here, the wealth of the ex-
change (the principal) depends on the market order flows, which are a function of the volumes posted
by the market maker (the agent). However, the exchange cannot control those volumes and may
only provide incentives to influence the market maker’s behavior. These incentives take the form of a
contract between the market maker and the exchange, whose payoff depends on observed trading flows.
To find an optimal contract and optimal volumes for the market maker in response to this contract, we
need to solve a nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB for short) equation. Dimensionality (above
four) and complexity of the resulting equations do not allow us to apply classical root-finding algo-
rithms. Therefore we use a method based on neural networks to solve our HJB equations. Neural
networks have been at the core of recent studies on high-dimensional PDE resolution. In [13], the au-
thors introduce a deep learning-based methodology that can handle general high-dimensional parabolic
PDEs. This approach relies on the reformulation of PDEs via Backward Stochastic Differential Equa-
tions, where neural networks approximate the gradients of the unknown solution. Since then, many
extensions have been proposed, see for example [2, 14].
In our setting, the market maker has to fix volumes in response to the incentives of the exchange.
These volumes are functions of the incentives (and of the market maker’s inventory), which are the
solution of a nonlinear equation. The resolution of our principal-agent problem consists of two stages.
The first stage is to represent the volumes posted by the market maker by a neural network. Taking
into account the optimal response of the market maker to given incentives, the exchange needs to
choose the contract maximizing its utility. So the second stage is to solve a HJB equation to obtain the
optimal contract. However, dimensionality and the high degree of nonlinearity of this equation make
standard numerical methods hard to apply. We circumvent this difficulty by adopting a reinforcement
learning method. More precisely, we use an actor-critic approach where not only the controls of the
exchange, but also its value function are represented by neural networks. The essence of this method
is the alternation of the learning phases of the controls and of the value function.
The paper is organized as follows. Market dynamics are introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we first
investigate the problem of a market maker acting on both lit and dark venues without any incentive
policy from the exchange. His goal is to maximize his PnL process while managing his inventory risk.
It is a stochastic control problem, where the corresponding HJB equation cannot be solved explicitly.
We show existence and uniqueness of a viscosity solution for this equation.
In Section 4, we analyze the bi-level optimization problem associated with the issue of optimal con-
tracting between the market maker and the exchange owning both lit and dark pools. Following
recent works on make-take fees policies mentioned above, we first prove a representation theorem for
the contract proposed to the market maker. We then establish existence and uniqueness of a viscosity
solution for the HJB equation corresponding to the problem of the exchange.
A key difference with [3, 10] is the absence of a closed-form solution for the best response of the
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market maker to a given contract. Therefore, the HJB equation of the exchange cannot be solved
explicitly. In Section 5, we introduce a deep reinforcement learning method as a computational tool
enabling us to address both exchange and market maker’s problems in practice. We conclude this
section with numerical experiments, illustrating various behaviors of the market maker under different
market scenarios.
2 The market model
2.1 Stochastic basis
The framework considered throughout this paper is inspired by the article [1] in which the authors
investigate the problem of optimal market making without intervention of an exchange. Let T > 0 be
a finite horizon time and V l,Vd ⊂ N the sets of possible values for volumes in the lit and dark pools, of
cardinality #V l,#Vd. We define Ω := Ωc ×Ω
2(#V l+#Vd)
d with Ωc the set of continuous functions from
[0, T ] into R and Ωd the set of piecewise constant càdlàg functions from [0, T ] into N. Ω is a subspace
of the Skorokhod space D([0, T ],R2(#V
l+#Vd)+1) of càdlàg functions from [0, T ] into R2(#V
l+#Vd)+1 and
write F for the trace Borel σ-algebra on Ω, where the topology is the one associated with the usual
Skorokhod distance on D([0, T ],R2(#V
l+#Vd)+1).
We define (Xt)t∈[0,T ] := (Wt, N
i,j,k
t )t∈[0,T ],i∈{a,b},j∈{l,d},k∈Vj as the canonical process on Ω, that is for any
ω := (w, ni,j,k) ∈ Ω
Wt(ω) := w(t), N
i,j,k
t (ω) = n
i,j,k(t), i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d} and k ∈ Vj .
For any i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d} and k ∈ Vj, N i,j,kt denotes the total number of trades of size k made
between time 0 and time t, where a, b stand for the ask and bid side respectively and l, d for the lit
and dark pools respectively. Finally the process W represents the mid-price of the traded asset.
Then we define the probability P0 on (Ω,F) under which Wt and the N
i,j,k
t are independent, Wt is a
one-dimensional Brownian motion and the N i,j,kt , i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d}, k ∈ V
j are Poisson processes
with intensity ǫ > 0 small enough.3 Finally, we endow the space (Ω,F) with the (P0−completed)
canonical filtration F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] generated by (Xt)t∈[0,T ].
2.2 Traded volumes, market impact and latency
In this section, we formalize the connection between volumes posted by the market maker and arrival
intensity of market orders on the ask and bid sides of both venues. We also take into account market
impact phenomenon and latency effect in the dark pool.
2.2.1 Admissible controls, inventory process and market takers’ arrival flows
Let 2q ∈ N represent a risk limit for the market maker, which corresponds to the maximum num-
ber of cumulated bid and ask orders the market maker can handle. We define the volume process
3In other words, P0 is the product measure of the Wiener measure on Ωc and the unique measure on Ω
2(#Vl+#Vd)
d
so that the canonical process corresponds to a multidimensional homogeneous Poisson process with arbitrary small
intensity, representing a situation where no liquidity is available.
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(Lt)t∈[0,T ] := (L
l
t,L
d
t )t∈[0,T ] ∈ (V
l)2 × (Vd)2, where Llt = (ℓ
a,l
t , ℓ
b,l
t )t∈[0,T ] and L
d
t = (ℓ
a,d
t , ℓ
b,d
t )t∈[0,T ] with
ℓi,jt corresponding to the volume posted by the market maker at time t on side i ∈ {a, b} of pool
j ∈ {l, d}. The set A of admissible controls of the market maker is therefore defined as
A :=
{
(Lt)t∈[0,T ] predictable, s.t for i ∈ {a, b}, ℓ
i,l + ℓi,d ∈ [0, 2q]
}
.
The market maker manages his inventory Qt, defined as the aggregated sum of the volumes filled on
both sides of the lit and dark pools, namely
Qt :=
∑
j∈{l,d}
∑
(ka,j ,kb,j)∈(Vj)2
kb,jN b,j,kt − k
a,jNa,j,kt .
Remark 2.1. Note that we assume that there is no partial execution in our model. Therefore market
orders consume the whole volume posted by the market maker on the considered side and pool.
We define the function
ψi,j(Llt) :=
{
Ia(Llt) if (i, j) ∈ {(a, l), (b, d)}
Ib(Llt) if (i, j) ∈ {(b, l), (a, d)},
where Ia(Llt) :=
ℓ
a,l
t
ℓ
a,l
t +ℓ
b,l
t
, Ib(Llt) :=
ℓ
b,l
t
ℓ
a,l
t +ℓ
b,l
t
represent the imbalances on the ask and bid sides of the
lit pool respectively. To model the behavior of market takers, we define the intensities of the pro-
cesses N i,j,k as
λL,i,j,kt := λ
i,j(Llt)1{φ(i)Q
t−
>−q,ℓi,jt =k}
, φ(i) :=
{
1 if i = a
−1 if i = b,
where
λi,j(Llt) := A
j exp
(
−
θj
σ
ψi,j(Llt)
)
1{Llt 6=(0,0)}
+ ǫ1{Llt=(0,0)},
where σ > 0 is the volatility of the asset’s mid-price. A high imbalance on the ask side decreases the
probability that an ask limit order is filled in the lit pool and conversely for the bid side. Moreover,
when the imbalance on the ask (resp. bid) side of the lit pool is high, if a market taker wants to buy,
it is worth trying it in the dark pool, because the high imbalance indicates that the ask price in the
lit may not be competitive. The coefficients θl, θd > 0 represent the influence of the imbalance on the
intensity of orders’ arrivals and Al, Ad > 0 are average order flow intensity parameters.
For L ∈ A, we introduce a new probability measure PL under which W remains a one-dimensional
Brownian motion and for i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d}, k ∈ Vj the
NL,i,j,kt := N
i,j,k
t −
∫ t
0
λL,i,j,ku du
are martingales. This probability measure is defined by the corresponding Doléans-Dade exponential
LLt := exp

 ∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
∫ t
0
1{φ(i)Q
u−
>−q,ℓi,jt =k}
(
log
(
λi,j(Llu)
ǫ
)
dN i,j,ku −
(
λi,j(Llu)− ǫ
)
du
),
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which is a true martingale by the uniform boundedness of the ℓi,j.4 We can therefore set the Girsanov
change of measure with dP
L
dP0
|Ft = L
L
t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, all the probability measures P
L
indexed by L are equivalent. We write ELt for the conditional expectation with respect to Ft under
the probability measure PL. We also define for i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d} the processes
N i,jt :=
∑
k∈Vj
N i,j,kt
of intensities λi,j(Llt)1{φ(i)Qt−>−q}. These processes correspond to the total number of transactions
executed on the bid or ask side of the lit or dark pools.
2.2.2 Efficient price and market impact
We define the efficient price of the underlying asset, observable by all market participants (in the
sense that they can infer it) as
S˜t := S˜0 + σWt,
where S˜0 > 0 is the initial price of the underlying asset and σ > 0 its volatility. When a limit order
on the bid side is filled, the price decreases on average and conversely for the ask side (this is the
so-called market impact, see for example [5, 19]). Thus, we define the mid-price of the asset at time
t ∈ [0, T ] by
St := S˜t +
∑
j∈{l,d}
∫ t
0
Γjℓa,ju dN
a,j
u − Γ
jℓb,ju dN
b,j
u , (2.1)
where Γl,Γd > 0 are fixed constants representing the magnitude of market impact in the lit and dark
pools.
Remark 2.2. The market impact parameters Γl,Γd are taken small enough with respect to the tick
size to discard obvious arbitrage opportunities. Moreover, as the market impact in the dark pool is
usually smaller or delayed compared to the lit pool, we will take Γl ≥ Γd.
2.2.3 Latency in the dark pool
We assume that in the lit pool, the best bid and best ask prices P b,l and P a,l satisfy
P b,lt := St −
T
2
, P a,lt := St +
T
2
, t ∈ [0, T ],
where T
2
> 0 is the half tick of the market. In this setting, in the lit pool, the market maker only
needs to control the volumes he posts.
In the dark pool, orders may be executed at the mid-price, which is a priori beneficial for market
takers. In practice, due to latency effect in the dark pool, the mid-price can change by one half tick
(or more) before the transaction is made. Therefore the order may be executed at a less advantageous
4The associated Novikov criterion is given in [18].
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price for the market taker (and sometimes at an even more advantageous one but we neglect this case
for the sake of simplicity). Let us introduce the corresponding prices with and without latency:

P
b,d,lat
t := St −
T
2
, P a,d,latt := St +
T
2
,
P b,d,non-latt := St, P
a,d,non-lat
t := St.
Recall that in most dark pools, market takers are supposed to be executed at the mid-price of the
lit pool. However, the higher the imbalance on the ask (resp. bid) side of the lit pool, the higher
the probability that the mid-price will move down (resp. up) quickly. To model the latency effect,
we introduce Bernoulli random variables νat ∼ Ber
(
Ia(Llt)
)
, νbt ∼ Ber
(
Ib(Llt)
)
which are associated
to each incoming market order in the dark pool.5 If νt = 1, there is no latency, and conversely for
νt = 0. So we define
Na,d,latt :=
∫ t
0
(1− νau)dN
a,d
u , N
a,d,non-lat
t :=
∫ t
0
νaudN
a,d
u ,
and
N b,d,latt :=
∫ t
0
(1− νbu)dN
b,d
u , N
b,d,non-lat
t :=
∫ t
0
νbudN
b,d
u .
Note that for any t ∈ [0, T ], N i,d,latt +N
i,d,non-lat
t = N
i,d
t for i ∈ {a, b}. To our knowledge, our approach
is the first one considering market making in the dark pool taking into account latency effect.
3 Market making without the intervention of the exchange
We address the problem of a market maker acting in the lit and dark pools, without intervention of
the exchange. The profit and loss (PnL for short) of the market maker is defined as the sum of the
cash earned from his executed orders and the value of his inventory. Thus it is expressed as
PLLt :=W
L
t +QtSt,
where, at time t ∈ [0, T ],
WLt :=
∫ T
0
(
St +
T
2
)
ℓa,lt dN
a,l
t −
∫ T
0
(
St −
T
2
)
ℓb,lt dN
b,l
t +
∫ T
0
(
St +
T
2
)
ℓa,dt dN
a,d,lat
t
+
∫ T
0
Stℓ
a,d
t dN
a,d,non-lat
t −
∫ T
0
(
St −
T
2
)
ℓb,dt dN
b,d,lat
t −
∫ T
0
Stℓ
b,d
t dN
b,d,non-lat
t
represents his cash process and QtSt is the mark-to-market value of his inventory.
6 Note that market
making activity in the dark pool without latency does not generate PnL through spread collection.
We consider a risk averse market maker with exponential utility function and risk aversion parame-
ter γ > 0. We define his optimization problem as
V MM0 = sup
L∈A
JMM0 (L), (3.1)
5We take the convention Ia(0, 0) = Ib(0, 0) = 0.
6Note that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
∫ t
0
ℓi,ju dN
i,j
u =
∑
k∈Vj kN
i,j,k
t .
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with for all t ∈ [0, T ],
JMMt (L) = E
L
[
− exp
(
− γ(PLLT − PL
L
t )
)]
.
Inspired by [10], we prove a dynamic programming principle for the control problem (3.1), see Sec-
tion A.1, from which we derive the corresponding HJB equation. We define O = [0, 2q]4. Similarly
to [12], we use a change of variable (see Equation (4.14) for the form of the ansatz) to reduce the
initial problem to the following HJB equation:
0 = ∂tv(t, q) + v(t, q)
1
2
σ2γ2q2
+ sup
L∈O


∑
(kl,kd)∈V l×Vd

 ∑
i∈{a,b}
λL,i,l,k
l
t
(
exp
(
− γℓi,l
(T
2
+ Γl(φ(i)q − ℓi,l)
))
v(t, q − φ(i)kl)− v(t, q)
)
+
∑
i∈{a,b}
∑
κ∈K
λL,i,d,k
d
t φ
d(i, κ)
(
exp
(
−γℓi,d
(T
2
φlat(κ)+Γd(φ(i)q−ℓi,d)
))
v(t,q− φ(i)kd)−v(t, q)
)

,
(3.2)
with K := {lat, non-lat},
φlat(κ) :=
{
1 if κ = lat
0 if κ = non-lat
, φd(i, κ) :=
{
Ib(Ll) if (i, κ) ∈ {(a, lat), (b, non-lat)}
Ia(Ll) if (i, κ) ∈ {(a, non-lat), (b, lat)}
and terminal condition v(T, ·) = −1. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique viscosity solution to the HJB equation (3.2). It satisfies
V MM0 = v(0, Q0).
The supremum in (3.2) characterizes the optimal controls L⋆ ∈ A.
The proof follows the same arguments as Theorem 3 in Section A.3.
We see that the supremum over L is not separable with respect to each control process as in [10, 12].
To our best knowledge there is no explicit expression for the optimal controls of the market maker.
Nevertheless, as shown in Section 5.2, we can solve PDE (3.2) numerically. More precisely, we make
use of deep reinforcement learning techniques to approximate the optimal volumes posted of the
market maker.
4 Market making with the intervention of the exchange
Let us now consider the case where a make-take fees system is in place and influences the amount of
liquidity provided by the market maker on both lit and dark venues.
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4.1 Modified PnL of the market maker
Following the principal-agent approach of [10], we now assume that the exchange gives to the market
maker a compensation ξ defined as an FT−measurable random variable, which is added to his PnL
process at terminal time T . This contract, designed by the exchange, aims at creating incentives so
that the market maker attracts more transactions.
Therefore, the total payoff of the market maker at time T is now given by WLT + QTST + ξ. The
problem of the market maker then becomes
V MM0 (ξ) := sup
L∈A
JMM0 (L, ξ), (4.1)
with
JMMt
(
L, ξ
)
:= ELt
[
− exp
(
− γ(PLLT − PL
L
t + ξ)
)]
.
To ensure that this functional is non-degenerate, we impose the following technical condition on ξ
(see the next section for the definition of an admissible contract):
sup
L∈A
E
L
[
exp
(
− γ′ξ
)]
< +∞, for some γ′ > γ, (4.2)
so that the optimization problem of the market maker is well-posed.
For a fixed compensation ξ, the optimal response L⋆ associated with the market maker’s problem
(4.1) is defined as
JMM0 (L
⋆, ξ) = V MM0 (ξ) for L
⋆ ∈ A. (OC)
We now consider the problem of the exchange wishing to attract liquidity on its platforms.
4.2 Objective function of the exchange
We assume that the exchange receives fixed fees cl, cd > 0 for each market order occurring in the lit
and dark pools respectively. As in [10], since we are working on a short time interval, we take cl, cd
independent of the price of the asset.
The goal of the exchange is essentially to maximize the total number of market orders sent during
the period of interest. As the arrival intensities of market orders are controlled by the market maker
through L, the contract ξ should aim at increasing these intensities. Thus, the exchange subsidizes
the agent at time T with the compensation ξ so that its PnL is given by
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
cj
∫ T
0
ℓi,jt dN
i,j
t − ξ.
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We now need to specify the set of admissible contracts potentially offered by the exchange. We assume
that the exchange has exponential utility function with risk aversion parameter η > 0. The natural
well-posedness condition for the problem of the exchange is
E
L∗
[
exp
(
η′ξ
)]
< +∞, for some η′ > η, (4.3)
for any L⋆ satisfying condition (OC).
Since the N i,j are point processes with bounded intensities, this condition, together with Hölder
inequality, ensure that the problem of the exchange is well-defined. We also assume that the market
maker only accepts contracts ξ such that V MM0 (ξ) is above some threshold value R < 0, that is ξ must
satisfy
V MM0 (ξ) ≥ R. (R)
This threshold, called reservation utility of the agent, is the critical utility value under which the
market maker has no interest in the contract. This quantity has to be taken into account carefully
by the exchange when proposing a contract to the market maker. We can therefore define the space
of admissible contracts C by
C :=
{
ξ ∈ FT , s.t (4.2), (4.3) and (R) are satisfied
}
.
Thus the contracting problem the exchange has to solve is
V E0 := sup
ξ∈C
E
L⋆

− exp
(
− η
( ∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
cj
∫ T
0
ℓi,jt dN
i,j
t − ξ
)). (4.4)
In the next section, we characterize the form of an admissible contract ξ ∈ C.7
4.3 Design of an optimal make-take fees policy
4.3.1 A class of contracts built on transactions
Inspired by [10], we prove in this section that without loss of generality, we can consider a specific
form of contracts, defined by some Y0 ∈ R and a predictable process Z = (Z
S˜, Z i,j,k)i∈{a,b},j∈{l,d},k∈Vj
chosen by the principal. A contract ξ of this form can be written as
ξ=Y Y0,ZT := Y0 +
∫ T
0
( ∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
Z i,j,ku dN
i,j,k
u
)
+Z S˜udS˜u +
(
1
2
γσ2(Z S˜u +Qu)
2−H(Zu, Qu)
)
du, (4.5)
where
H(z, q) := sup
L∈A
h(L, z, q), (4.6)
7Note that for fixed ξ, the control L⋆ is not necessarily unique. However, numerical results seem to indicate its
uniqueness. Otherwise we could also consider a supremum over all L⋆ satisfying (OC), as it is usually done in principal-
agent theory (see for instance [9, Section 2.4]).
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and h : R4+×R
2(#V l+#Vd)×Z→ R is the Hamiltonian of the agent’s problem.8 To ensure admissibility
of the contract, the process (Zt)t∈[0,T ] has to satisfy the following technical conditions:
sup
L∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
L
[
exp
(
− γ′Y 0,Zt
)]
< +∞, for some γ′ > γ, (4.7)
and ∫ T
0
|Z S˜t |
2 + |H(Zt, Qt)|dt < +∞. (4.8)
Given this integrability condition, the process (Y 0,Zt )t∈[0,T ] is well-defined. The contract consists of
the following elements:
• The constant Y0 is calibrated by the exchange to ensure that the reservation utility constraint
(R) of the market maker is satisfied.9
• The term Z S˜ is the compensation given to the market maker with respect to the volatility risk
induced by the efficient price S˜.
• Every time a trade of size k occurs on the ask or bid side of the lit or dark pool, the market
maker receives Z i,j,k.
• The term 1
2
γσ2(Z S˜ +Q)2 −H(Z,Q) is a continuous coupon given to the market maker.
Remark 4.1. In our setting, the volumes of limit orders do not belong to the canonical process and
so the principal does not contract on the volumes displayed by the market maker. It is very reasonable
as in practice, a large part of volumes sent by market makers are not executed or rapidly canceled.
Therefore it is clearly preferable to build contracts based on actual transactions. Moreover, note that S˜,
and not the mid-price S, appears in the contract (2.1). This is not an issue since S can be decomposed
into elements of the canonical process.
Formally stated, the definition of the space Ξ of contracts of the form (4.5) is
Ξ=
{
Y Y0,ZT ∈FT , Y0∈R, Z ∈ Z, s.t (R) holds
}
,
where Z denotes the set of processes defined by
Z :=
{
(Z S˜, Z i,j,k), i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d}, k ∈ Vj s.t (4.3), (4.7), (4.8) are satisfied
}
. (4.9)
4.3.2 Solving the market maker’s problem
For (L, z, q) ∈ (V l)2× (Vd)2×R2(#V
l+#Vd)×Z we define the Hamiltonian of the market maker, which
appears in the contract Y Y0,ZT via the continuous coupon H(Z,Q), by
h(L, z, q) :=
∑
(kl,kd)∈V l×Vd

 ∑
i∈{a,b}
γ−1

(1−exp(−γ(zi,l,kl + ℓi,l(T
2
+φ(i)Γlq)−Γl(ℓi,l)2
)))
λL,i,l,k
l
t
+
∑
κ∈K
(
1−exp
(
−γ
(
zi,d,k
d
+ℓi,d(
T
2
φlat(κ)+φ(i)Γdq)−Γd(ℓi,d)2
)))
λL,i,d,k
d
t φ
d(i, κ)



.
(4.10)
8Its form is defined in (4.10). This Hamiltonian term appears naturally when applying the dynamic programming
principle for the market maker’s problem.
9From Theorem 2, Yˆ0 = −γ−1 log(−R) ensures that the reservation utility constraint of the market maker is satisfied.
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The next theorem states that the two sets C and Ξ are, in fact, equal. Moreover, the contract
representation (4.5) enables us to provide a solution to the market maker’s problem (4.1). The proof
is given in Section A.2.
Theorem 2. Any admissible contract can be written under the form (4.5), that is C = Ξ. Moreover,
for any Y Y0,ZT ∈ Ξ we have
V MM0 (Y
Y0,Z
T ) = − exp(−γY0),
and Condition (OC) with ξ = Y Y0,ZT is equivalent to the fact that L satisfies h(Lt, Zt, Qt) = H(Zt, Qt)
for any t ∈ [0, T ].
This theorem provides a tractable form of contracts for the design of a suitable make-take fees policy.
Given the knowledge of the market maker’s response to a given contract, we reformulate the problem
of the exchange and prove the existence and uniqueness of the associated value function.
4.4 Problem of the exchange
4.4.1 Reformulation of the problem
Following Theorem 2, the contracting problem (4.4) is reduced to
V E0 := sup
(Y0,Z,L)∈R×Z×A,
h(Lt,Zt,Qt)=H(Zt,Qt),∀t∈[0,T ]
E
L

− exp
(
− η
( ∑
i={a,b}
j={l,d}
cj
∫ T
0
ℓi,jt dN
i,j
t − Y
Y0,Z
T
)). (4.11)
For a given contract Y Y0,Z , due to the form of (4.10), the market maker’s optimal response does not
depend on Y0. With the exchange’s objective function being decreasing in Y0, the maximization with
respect to Y0 is achieved at the level Yˆ0 = −γ
−1 log(−R). Therefore Problem (4.11) can be reduced
to
vE0 := sup
(Z,L)∈Z×A
h(Lt,Zt,Qt)=H(Zt,Qt),∀t∈[0,T ]
J (Z,L), (4.12)
where
J (Z,L) = EL

− exp
(
− η
( ∑
i={a,b}
j={l,d}
cj
∫ T
0
ℓi,jt dN
i,j
t − Y
0,Z
T
)).
4.4.2 A bi-level optimization problem
We define D := [0, T ] × R × N2(#V
l+#Vd) × N2(#V
l+#Vd) × R and for any vector p, i ∈ {1, . . . ,#p},
p−i = (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , p#p) ∈ N#p−1. By Equation (4.4) and the corresponding footnote, there
might be more than one optimal response L⋆ of the market maker. We show here how to solve the
principal’s problem for a specific optimal response L⋆.10 Using a dynamic programming principle
10If there are several optimal responses L⋆, the exchange should solve the HJB equation (4.13) for every L⋆ and,
according to principal-agent theory, choose the optimal response that maximizes its own utility.
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similar to the one in Lemma A.1, we write the value function of the exchange’s problem, vE : D→ R,
as
vE(t, S˜t, N¯t, Nt, Yt) := sup
Z∈Z
E
L⋆
t

− exp
(
− η
( ∑
i={a,b}
j={l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
cj(N¯ i,j,kT − N¯
i,j,k
t )− Y
0,Z
T
)),
with
(N¯t, Nt) :=
(
kN i,j,kt , N
i,j,k
t
)
i={a,b},j={l,d},k∈Vj
,
and L⋆ = (ℓ⋆b,l(z, q), ℓ⋆a,l(z, q), ℓ⋆b,d(z, q), ℓ⋆a,d(z, q)) the optimal response of the market maker, in the
sense of (4.6), displayed at time t for a given inventory q and given incentives z of the exchange.
Recall that Qt =
∑
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj(N¯
b,j,k
t − N¯
a,j,k
t ). Usual arguments enables us to show that v
E is a
viscosity solution of the HJB equation defined on D by
0 =∂tv
E +
1
2
σ2∂S˜S˜v
E + sup
zS˜∈R
γσ2
2
(zS˜ + q)2∂yv
E +
σ2
2
(zS˜)2∂yyv
E + σ2zS˜∂S˜yv
E
+ sup
z∈R2(#Vl+#Vd)
∑
i={a,b}
j={l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
λL
⋆,i,j,k
t
(
∆i,j,k(z)v
E − ∂yv
EE(zi,j,k, ℓ⋆i,j(z, q))
)
,
(4.13)
where, for i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d},
∆i,j,k(z)v
E(t, s˜, n¯, n, y) := vE(t, s˜, n¯i,j,k + k, n¯−(i,j,k), ni,j,k + 1, n−(i,j,k), y + zi,j,k)− vE(t, s˜, n¯, n, y),
E(zi,l,k, ℓ⋆i,l(z, q)) :=
1
γ

1− exp(− γ(zi,l,k + ℓ⋆i,l(z, q)(T
2
+ φ(i)Γlq)− Γl(ℓ⋆i,l(z, q))2
)),
E(zi,d,k, ℓ⋆i,d(z, q)) :=
1
γ
∑
κ∈K
1−exp
(
−γ
(
zi,d,k+ℓ⋆i,d(z, q)(
T
2
φlat(κ)+φ(i)Γdq)−Γd(ℓ⋆i,d(z, q))2
))
φd(i, κ)

,
and terminal condition
vE(T, s˜, n¯, n, y) = − exp
(
− η(
∑
i={a,b}
j={l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
cjn¯i,j,k − y)
)
.
Remark that the best response of the market maker, for which we do not have explicit expression,
appears in the value function of the exchange. Inspired by [10, 12], we use the following ansatz for
Equation (4.13):
vE(t, s, n¯, n, y) = v(t, q) exp
(
− η(
∑
i={a,b}
j={l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
cjn¯i,j,k − y)
)
, (4.14)
where v is a solution of the following HJB equation{
0 = ∂tv(t, q) +H
(
q,L⋆, v(t, ·)
)
, q ∈ {−q, . . . , q}, t ∈ [0, T ),
v(T, q) = −1,
(4.15)
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with
H
(
q,L⋆t , v(t, ·)
)
:= sup
z∈R2(#Vl+#Vd)+1
U
(
z, q,L⋆(z, q), v(t, ·)
)
, (4.16)
and
U
(
z, q,L⋆(z, q), v(t, ·)
)
:= v(t, q)
(
η
2
σ2γ
(
zS˜ + q
)2
+
η2σ2
2
(
zS˜
)2)
+
∑
i={a,b}
j={l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
λL
⋆,i,j,k
t
(
exp(η(zi,j,k − kcj))v
(
t, q − φ(i)k
)
− v
(
t, q
)(
1 + η E(zi,j,k, ℓ⋆i,j(z, q))
))
.
This ansatz leads to dimensionality reduction from five to two parameters. Using [4, Corollary 1.4.2],
there exists a unique continuous viscosity solution associated to (4.15).
Remark 4.2. Note that the supremum over zS˜ is explicit and given by zS˜ = − γ
γ+η
q as in [10].
4.4.3 Solving the exchange’s problem
Making use of the ansatz v, the bi-level optimization problem (4.12) is reduced to solving the following
system:
{
0 = ∂tv(t, q) +H
(
q,L⋆t , v(t, ·)
)
, with final condition v(T, q) = −1,
h(L⋆, z, q) = H(z, q), q ∈ {−q, . . . , q}.
(4.17)
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. There exists a unique continuous viscosity solution to HJB equation (4.15). It satisfies
vE0 = v(0, Q0) = v
E(0, S˜0, N¯0, N0, Y0).
Moreover, the optimal incentives of the principal Z⋆ are solutions of the supremum in (4.15).
The proof can be found in Section A.3.
Theorem 3 allows us to use numerical methods to obtain the optimizers
(
Z⋆(t, Qt−),L
⋆
(
Z⋆(t, Qt−), Qt−
))
t∈[0,T ]
(4.18)
of the bi-level problem (4.17). Moreover, the optimal contract is given by
ξ⋆= Yˆ0 +
∫ T
0
( ∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
Z⋆i,j,ku dN
i,j,k
u
)
+Z⋆S˜u dS˜u +
(
1
2
γσ2(Z⋆S˜u +Qu)
2−H(Z⋆u, Qu)
)
du.
The second problem in (4.17) is a classical optimization problem. Having found numerically L⋆(z, q),
we solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (4.15) using neural networks.
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Remark 4.3. Theorem 3 characterizes only the value function of the exchange and not the optimal
incentives defined in (4.18), which are computed through deep reinforcement learning techniques. In
particular, there is no guarantee of admissibility of the incentives (Z⋆(t, Qt−))t∈[0,T ] solving (4.16).
However, we observe numerically (see Figure 5) that these incentive parameters are essentially linear
(despite nonlinear nature of neural networks) in the inventory Q at any fixed time t. This result
is indeed quite usual in the optimal market making literature where asymptotic development of the
function v is used, so v should be regular enough (see [12, Section 4] or [1, Section 3.2]). The
linearity of the incentives Z⋆ implies them to be in the set of admissible contracts Z defined by (4.9).
5 Numerical solution: a deep reinforcement learning ap-
proach
We now turn to the description of our numerical method to solve (4.17), the optimization procedure
consists of two stages. At the first stage, we optimize the controls of the market maker for all possible
values of the incentives given by the exchange. At the second stage, we use an actor-critic approach,
to obtain both the optimal controls and the value function of the exchange. We conclude this section
with numerical experiments showing the impact of incentives as well as that of market conditions
on the volumes posted by the market maker on both lit and dark venues regulated by the exchange.
Throughout these experiments, we assume the following:
Assumption 5.1. For all i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d} and k ∈ Vj, Z i,j,k = Z i,j ∈ R.
This means that the principal provides incentives only with respect to the number of transactions on
each side of each pool independently of the volumes. In that case, HJB equation (4.15) remains valid.
Recall that the optimal incentives depend on time and market maker’s inventory, therefore, implicitly
they depend on the transacted volume.
There is obvious bid-ask symmetry in our model with respect to the inventory of the market maker,
as it can be seen in Hamiltonian (4.10). Thus for our numerical experiments we impose symmetry
of the incentives with respect to q. As a consequence, we have symmetry of volumes posted by the
market maker with respect to q, given incentives satisfying the bid-ask symmetry property.
5.1 Description
5.1.1 Market maker’s problem
The first step to tackle our principal-agent problem is to find optimal volumes L⋆ = (ℓ⋆a,l, ℓ⋆b,l, ℓ⋆a,d, ℓ⋆b,d),
by solving for any couple (z, q), the maximization problem of the market maker (4.6). To do so, we
introduce a continuous version of the Hamiltonian (4.10) with respect to L, that is we maximize the
following functional:
L 7−→ hc(L, z, q) :=
∑
i∈{a,b}
γ−1

(1−exp(−γ(zi,l + ℓi,l(T
2
+φ(i)Γlq)−Γl(ℓi,l)2
)))
λi,l(Llt)
+
∑
κ∈K
(
1−exp
(
−γ
(
zi,d+ℓi,d(
T
2
φlat(κ)+φ(i)Γdq)−Γd(ℓi,d)2
)))
λi,d(Llt)φ
d(i, κ)

.
(5.1)
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For fixed incentives, we have that L⋆a,l(q) = L⋆b,l(−q). Because of the intricate form of the func-
tion hc, we cannot have an explicit solution to the first order condition ∇Lh
c = 0, which is four-
dimensional. Moreover, we do not have an a priori knowledge on the functional form of optimizers
L⋆ : R4 × [−q, q] → R4+, so we cannot apply canonical root-finding methods. Therefore to address
this problem, we approximate the best response of the market maker by a neural network.
Although we do not use a purely grid-based method, we need to define a domain for arguments q and
z. In our model inventory q of the market maker is bounded and evolves between risk limits −q and
q. We also define a bound z for the incentives z ∈ R4, so that z ∈ [−z, z]4. This is in fact justified
also by the paper [10] in which optimal incentives are proved to be bounded.
We approximate the best response function L⋆ by a neural network l[ωl], where ωl are the weights of
the neural network.11 The neural network l[ωl] takes as inputs principal’s incentives and the market
maker’s current inventory (za,l, zb,l, za,d, zb,d, q), which are normalized by z and q respectively. The
network is composed of 2 hidden layers with 10 nodes in each of them and with ELU activation
functions. ELU activation function is of the form
ELU(x) =

α(e
x − 1), for x ≤ 0
x, for x > 0,
where α is a non-negative parameter, usually taken equal to 1.
The final layer of the network contains four outputs, and the activation function is sigmoid (for the
outputs to be between 0 and 1). The output of l[ωl] is then renormalized via multiplication by q to
obtain volumes between 0 and q.
To obtain optimal volumes of the market maker, we minimize the opposite of the Hamiltonian function
defined by Equation (5.1). We generate K > 0 random samples of z and q, and conduct several epochs
of batch learning with the following weights update:
ωl ← ωl + µl
1
K
K∑
k=1
∇ωl l[ω
l](zk, qk)
(
∇lh
c(l[ωl](zk, qk), zk, qk)− ρ
(
(qk + l[ω
l]b,l + l[ωl]b,d − q)+
+(qk − l[ω
l]a,l − l[ωl]a,d + q)−
))
,
where µl is the learning rate. The term scaled by ρ corresponds to a penalty employed to force quotes
to stay in A, so that l[ωl]i,l + l[ωl]i,d ∈ [0, 2q], i ∈ {a, b}. In our computations we use ρ = 0.1.
Let us denote by l⋆[ωl] the approximated optimal response function of the market maker L⋆ (the
result of the above optimization procedure). In Figure 1, we see an example of the best response
l⋆[ωl] as a function of za,l = −zb,l, when the market maker’s inventory q = 50 and other incentives
za,d = zb,d = 0.05 (close to zero). Remark that the choice of incentives is arbitrary only and aimed at
reflecting the main properties of l⋆[ωl].
11Here we slightly abuse notation denoting by l[ωl] the response of the market maker obtained via neural network
parametrized by weights ωl.
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Figure 1: Best response of the market maker as a function of za,l and zb,l, with q = 50.
The observed behavior has quite natural interpretation. The incentive za,l is a remuneration of the
market maker when his limit order is executed on the ask side of the lit pool. When this incentive
increases, the market maker ensures to have a small imbalance on the ask side of the lit pool so that
he can earn za,l. Because of his positive inventory, the volume posted on the ask side of the dark
pool is higher than on the bid side of the dark pool: the market maker wants to liquidate his long
position. Similarly when the incentive zb,l increases, the market maker wants to benefit from it when
transacting on the bid side of the lit pool. This explains the small imbalance on the bid side of the lit
pool for positive zb,l. Mathematically speaking, the function hc is increasing in za,l. Thus for a high
za,l, the value of the term E(za,l, l⋆[ωl]a,l) in the Hamiltonian is high. To benefit from the remuneration
za,l, the intensity λa,l must be high, which implies a small imbalance on the ask side, hence Ia should
be small. Similarly for zb,l.
For q = 150, zb,l = −za,l, and other incentives za,d = zb,d = 0.05 (close to zero), we display the
volumes in Figure 2:
−2.0−1.5−1.0−0.50.00.51.01.52.0
zb, l
−2.0 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
za, l
0
50
100
150
200
250
300 ask lit
bid lit
ask dark
bid dark
Figure 2: Best response of the market maker as a function of za,l and zb,l, with q = 150.
As the market maker has a higher inventory, his quotes on the bid side of both pools decrease because
of the inventory risk. Moreover, his quotes on the ask side of both pools increase to liquidate his
long position. For high incentives zb,l, a small volume on the bid side of the lit pool leads to a low
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imbalance on the bid side, hence a high probability of execution for passive ask orders in the dark
pool, where the market maker tries to liquidate his position. Note that for high za,l, the imbalance is
approximately equal to one half, because the market maker does not want to suffer from the latency
effect (to be executed at the mid-price in the dark pool).
We now move to the problem of the principal.
5.1.2 An actor-critic approach to solve HJB equation (4.15)
A numerical approximation of the optimal incentives z⋆ can be obtained by
1. solving (numerically) the static maximization problem (5.1), which provides the approximation
of the optimal response L⋆ of the market maker,
2. plugging this approximation in the continuous (with respect to L⋆) version of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation (4.15), that is to say:
{
0 = ∂tv(t, q) +H
c
(
q,L⋆, v(t, ·)
)
, q ∈ [−q, q], t ∈ [0, T ),
v(T, q) = −1,
with
Hc
(
q,L⋆, v(t, ·)
)
:= sup
z∈R5
U c
(
z, q,L⋆(z, q), v(t, ·)
)
,
and abusing the notation with L⋆ denoting L⋆(z, q)
U c
(
z, q,L⋆, v(t, ·)
)
:= v(t, q)
(
η
2
σ2γ
(
zS˜ + q
)2
+
η2σ2
2
(
zS˜
)2)
+
∑
i={a,b}
j={l,d}
λi,j(L⋆l)
(
exp(η(zi,j − cjℓ⋆i,j))v
(
t, q − φ(i)ℓ⋆i,j
)
− v
(
t, q
)(
1 + η E(zi,j, ℓ⋆i,j)
))
.
We obtain explicitly zS˜ = − γ
γ+η
q, so we are only interested in finding optimal (za,l, zb,l, za,d, zb,d). The
classical method to solve the above problem is to obtain an approximation of the value function via a
finite difference scheme on a grid. Since the size of the grid increases exponentially with the number
of dimensions, using this approach is not possible for a high dimension. Therefore, to address our
five-dimensional optimization problem, we resort to neural networks.
We use an algorithm known in reinforcement learning literature as the actor-critic method. The core
of this approach is the representation of the value function and optimal controls with deep neural
networks. The learning procedure itself consists of two stages: value function update (also called
critic update) and controls update (actor update).
We first split our problem into sub-problems corresponding to different time steps. We consider a
time step ∆t. The first-order approximation of the value function at time t gives
v(t, ·) ≈ v(t+∆t, ·)− ∂tv(t+∆t, ·).
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For each time step ∆t, we represent the value function and the incentives with neural networks. Our
procedure is backward in time, and we start from T − ∆t, recalling that v(T, ·) = −1. Let us fix
t ∈ [0, T − ∆t]. Value function at time t is represented by vt[ω
vt ](·) which is a feedforward neural
network, parameterized by weights ωvt , which approximates the value function corresponding to the
current set of incentives approximated by the neural network zt[ω
zt](·), parametrized by ωzt. Critic’s
network is composed of 2 hidden layers with 20 nodes in each of these layers with ELU activation
functions. The final layer of the network contains one output, and the activation is affine. Actor’s
network is composed of 2 hidden layers with 20 nodes in each of these layers with ELU activation
functions. The final layer of the network contains four outputs, and the activation is tanh (this allows
the output to stay between −1 and 1), which is therefore renormalized by z. The first step is the
following update of the value function network’s weights ωvt :
ωvt←ωvt+µv
1
K
K∑
k=1
∇ωvtvt[ω
vt](qk)
(
vt+∆t[ω
vt+∆t](qk)+U
c(zt[ω
zt](qk), qk, l
⋆[ωl],vt+∆t[ω
vt+∆t](·))−vt[ω
vt](qk)
)
,
where µv is a learning rate, U c(zt[ω
zt](qk), qk, l
⋆[ωl], vt[ω
vt](·)) corresponds to the function under the
supremum of the Hamiltonian (4.16) calculated using the current controls zt[ω
zt]. The quantities
qk, k ∈ {1, . . . , K} are the elements of the training set, more precisely K uniformly distributed ele-
ments from the interval [−q, q]. We use U(zt[ω
zt](qk), qk, l
⋆[ωl], vt+∆t[ω
vt+∆t](·)) as an approximation
of ∂tv(t+∆t, ·) to apply the first order approximation of the value function described above.
When the value function’s neural network approximates the value function corresponding to the
current control zt[ω
zt], we can move to the stage of optimization over control values (also called policy
update in reinforcement learning literature). Our policy update consists of two different procedures.
The first one is an exploitation phase where the weights are updated according to the best direction
suggested by the gradient of the function U c(zt[ω
zt](qk), qk, l
⋆[ωl], vt[ω
vt ](·)):
ωzt ← ωzt + µz
1
K
K∑
k=1
∇ωztzt[ω
zt](qk)∇ztU
c
(
zt[ω
zt](qk), qk, l
⋆[ωl], vt[ω
vt ](·)
)
,
where µz is a learning rate. This type of updates is usually called policy gradient.
Another type of updates we use in the learning procedure is an exploration phase. During this phase,
we use the current values given by the neural network of controls and introduce noise to these values,
to explore the values slightly different from those proposed by the neural network. Noise is normally
distributed around 0 with standard deviation chosen beforehand (in the following examples, we use
standard normal distribution). This phase could help us to quit local minima, in case the algorithm
is trapped in one. The following updates characterize this phase:
ωzt ← ωzt + µˆz
1
K
K∑
k=1
εk∇ωztzt[ω
zt](qk)
(
U c
(
zt[ω
zt](qk) + ε, qk, l
⋆[ωl], vt[ω
vt](·)
)
− U c
(
zt[ω
zt](qk), qk, l
⋆[ωl], vt[ω
vt](·)
))
,
where ε is a vector of length K representing introduced perturbations and µˆz is a learning rate.
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5.2 Numerical Results
In the following we consider ∆t = 1. Since time has little impact on the quotes chosen by the market
maker (see [10, 12]), we present the results only for time T − 1, the extension to earlier time steps
is straightforward. As mentioned before, the optimization problems considered are symmetric with
respect to the inventory variable q.
5.2.1 Reference model without the exchange
First, we present a reference model without the intervention of the exchange. We consider the following
parameters:
• Risk aversion of the market maker: γ = 0.01;
• Market impacts: Γl = 10−4,Γd = 5× 10−5;
• Influence of the imbalance on the orders arrival: θl = θd = 0.15;
• Volatility: σ = 0.1;
• Fees: cl = 0.05, cd = 0.01;
• Order flow intensity parameter: Al = 5× 103, Ad = 3× 103.
In Figure 3, we present the optimal quotes of the market maker.
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Figure 3: Optimal quotes of the market maker.
One can see that the market maker splits his orders equitably between the lit and dark pools when
his inventory is near zero. However, when he has a very positive (resp. negative) inventory, he has
a large imbalance on the ask (resp. bid) side of the lit pool, to liquidate his position in the dark
pool. Such behavior shows that the market maker uses the dark pool as a way to liquidate a large
position by adjusting the imbalance in the lit pool. Indeed, when he posts a high volume on the ask
side of the lit pool, he encourages ask orders in the dark pool. Thus, as he prioritizes the execution
of a large ask order, he accepts to be executed at the mid-price in the dark pool. When q = 300, he
does not post a sell order of size 300 in the dark pool, because of the quadratic variation between the
mid-price and its inventory process (which can be seen as a quadratic penalty in the market maker’s
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PnL process with respect to the volumes displayed). Because of the latency generated on the ask side
of the lit pool, the market takers sending market orders on the bid side of the dark pool are likely to
be executed at an unfavorable price. This is why the market maker posts a non-zero volume on the
bid side of the dark pool. Remark also that for small inventories, the market maker posts volumes on
both ask and bid sides of the dark pool because he may accept to increase his inventory risk by being
executed at a more favorable price in the dark pool due to the latency effect (the volumes displayed
in the lit pool lead to 50 percents chance to face this effect at least on one of the sides of the dark
pool). Note that the parameters Al > Ad describe the fact that there are, on average, much more
orders in the lit pool than in the dark pool.12
In the following sections, we present several numerical experiments involving the incentive policy of
the exchange.
5.2.2 Reference model with the exchange
In this section, we present a reference model with the exchange. We take the same parameters as in
the case without the exchange, and we set the exchange’s risk aversion: η = 0.02.
In Figures 4 and 5, we present the optimal quotes of the market maker and the optimal incentives
provided by the exchange.
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Figure 4: Optimal quotes of the market maker.
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Figure 5: Optimal incentives of the exchange.
The presence of incentives has significant effects on the market maker’s behavior. When the market
maker has an inventory near zero, incentives lead to an increase of the volumes posted in the lit pool
and a decrease of that in the dark pool compared to Figure 3. Thus the exchange improves the liquid-
ity in the lit venue. Moreover, the strategy of the market maker for very positive or negative inventory
is modified. When he has a very positive inventory, he posts a higher volume on the ask side of the
dark pool than in the case without exchange. In addition to this, he posts an equal volumes (small
but not negligible) on the ask and bid sides of the lit pool. So we see that the exchange prevents
the market maker from artificial manipulation of the market, consisting in creation of high imbalance
on the ask side. As the imbalance is around 1/2, the market maker does not take advantage of the
latency effect.
12This assumption is consistent with the MIFID II regulation rolled out on January 3, 2018, which imposes a cap on
volumes traded in the dark pools.
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In Figure 5, we see that, even if our problem is much more intricate than those of [3, 10], the shape
of the principal’s incentives are essentially linear functions of the market maker’s inventory.
5.2.3 High volatility regime
We now investigate the impact of higher volatility on the posted volumes with and without the
exchange. We take σ = 0.4, the other parameters being as previously.
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Figure 6: Optimal quotes of the market maker
without the exchange.
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Figure 7: Optimal quotes of the market maker
with the exchange.
In Figure 6 we see that, compared to Figure 3, higher volatility does not change significantly the
strategy of the market maker without the exchange. We observe that the contract has more limited
influence in the case of high volatility as the market maker follows the same strategy as without
exchange. In particular, he does not keep his imbalance equal to 1/2 when he has a very positive or
negative inventory. This is because higher volatility leads to an increase in market activity, and the
market maker is more willing to send higher volumes on the side of interest of both pools.
5.2.4 Same parameters for the lit and dark pools
Here we show the volumes posted by the market maker and the incentives of the exchange, when the
lit and dark pools share the same characteristics. We consider the following set of parameters:
• Risk aversion of the market maker and of the exchange respectively: γ = 0.01, η = 0.02;
• Market impacts: Γl = Γd = 10−4;
• Influence of the imbalance on the orders arrival: θl = θd = 0.2;
• Volatility: σ = 0.2;
• Fees: cl = cd = 0.05;
• Order flow intensity parameters: Al = Ad = 5× 103.
In Figures 8 and 9, we see that the repartition of volumes between the lit and dark pools has not
changed significantly compared to the reference case with and without contract. The main difference is
that, in the absence of the exchange, the market maker posts higher volumes in the lit pool compared
to the dark one when he has a small inventory. It happens because the dark pool does not provide
lower market impact and transaction costs contrary to the reference case. Keeping his imbalance near
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1/2 for small inventories, the market maker still does not take advantage of the latency effect. Finally,
in both cases, the dark pool is still used by the market maker as a way to liquidate a high inventory.
−300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300
Inventory
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
Optimal volumes
ask lit
bid lit
ask dark
bid dark
Figure 8: Optimal quotes of the market maker
without the exchange.
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Figure 9: Optimal quotes of the market maker
with the exchange.
5.2.5 High market impact in the lit pool
We now show the volumes displayed by the market maker with and without the exchange, when the
parameters of the dark pool make it more appealing than the lit pool. In particular, the market
impact in the dark pool is five times smaller than in the lit pool. We consider the following set of
parameters:
• Risk aversion of the market maker and of the exchange respectively: γ = 0.01, η = 0.02;
• Market impacts: Γl = 10−4,Γd = 2× 10−5;
• Influence of the imbalance on the orders arrival: θl = θd = 0.15;
• Volatility: σ = 0.1;
• Fees: cl = 0.05, cd = 0.01;
• Order flow intensity parameters: Al = 5× 103, Ad = 3× 103.
−300 −200 −100 0 100 200 300
Inventory
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
Optimal volumes
ask lit
bid lit
ask dark
bid dark
Figure 10: Optimal quotes of the market maker
without the exchange.
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Figure 11: Optimal quotes of the market maker
with the exchange.
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In Figures 10 and 11, we see the influence of a higher market impact and transaction costs in the lit
pool. Either with or without the intervention of the exchange and for small inventories, the market
maker posts higher volumes in the dark pool than in the lit pool. We recover similar behavior for the
displayed volumes as in the reference case with and without the exchange in Figures 3 and 4.
5.2.6 High market impact on both venues
In this last section, we show how the volumes are split between the lit and dark pools when the market
impact in the lit and dark pools are equal. We consider the following set of parameters:
• Risk aversion of the market maker and of the exchange respectively: γ = 0.01, η = 0.02;
• Market impacts: Γl = Γd = 2.5× 10−4;
• Influence of the imbalance on the orders arrival: θl = θd = 0.15;
• Volatility: σ = 0.1;
• Fees: cl = 0.05, cd = 0.01;
• Order flow intensity parameters: Al = 5× 103, Ad = 3× 103.
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Figure 12: Optimal quotes of the market maker
without the exchange.
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Figure 13: Optimal quotes of the market maker
with the exchange.
In Figures 12 and 13, we see that a higher market impact reduces the volume posted on both lit and
dark pools. We also recover a behavior similar to the reference case without the exchange. For the
case with the exchange, for very positive (resp. negative) inventory, the market maker has an ask
(resp. bid) imbalance slightly above 1/2, meaning that market takers on the bid (resp. ask) of the
dark pool are more likely to be executed at a price unfavorable for them due to the latency effect.
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A Appendix
A.1 Dynamic programming principle and contract representation
For any F stopping time τ ∈ [t, T ] and L ∈ Aτ , we define:
JT (τ,L) = E
L
τ
[
−Dτ,T (L)exp
(
− γξ
)]
, Vτ = sup
L∈Aτ
JT (τ,L),
where Aτ denotes the restriction of A to controls on [τ, T ] and
Dτ,T (L) := exp
(
− γ
( ∫ T
τ
∑
i∈{a,b}
(
T
2
ℓi,lt dN
i,l
t +
∑
κ∈K
φlat(κ)
T
2
ℓi,dt dN
i,d,κ
t
)
+QtdSt + d
[
Q·, S·
]
t
))
,
where
d
[
Q·, S·
]
t
= −
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
Γjk2dN i,j,kt .
We now set the dynamic programming principle associated to the control problem (4.1).
Lemma A.1. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and τ be an F stopping time with values in [t, T ]. Then
Vt = ess sup
L∈A
E
L
t
[
−Dt,τ (L)Vτ
]
.
The proof can be found in [10, Lemma A.4].
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
To prove that C = Ξ, we proceed in six steps. Our approach is largely inspired by [10]. However, for
the sake of completeness, we provide here the details.
Step 1: For L ∈ A it follows from the dynamic programming principle of Lemma A.1 that the process
ULt = VtD0,t(L)
defines a PL-supermartingale for any L ∈ A. By standard analysis, we may then consider it in its
càdlàg version (by taking right limits along rationals). By the Doob-Meyer decomposition, we can
write ULt = M
L
t − A
L
t where M
L is a PL-martingale and ALt = A
L,c
t + A
L,d
t is an integrable non-
decreasing predictable process such that AL,c0 = A
L,d
0 = 0 with pathwise continuous component A
L,c
and with AL,d a piecewise constant predictable process.
From the martingale representation theorem under PL, see Appendix A.1 in [10], there exists Z˜L=
(Z˜L,S, Z˜L,i,j,k)i∈{a,b},j∈{l,d},k∈Vj predictable, such that
MLt = V0 +
∫ t
0
Z˜L,Sr dS˜r +
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
∫ t
0
Z˜L,i,jr dN
L,i,j
r .
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Step 2: We now show that V is a negative process. Thanks to the uniform boundedness of L ∈ A
and Ia, Ib ∈ [0, 1] we get that
LLT
LLt
≥ αt,T = exp
(
−
∑
j∈{l,d}
θj
σ
(Na,jT −N
a,j
t +N
b,j
T −N
b,j
t )− 2(A
j − ǫ)(T − t)
)
.
Therefore using the definition of Dt,T (L), we obtain
Vt ≤ E
0
t
[
− αt,T exp
(
− γ
(
3(T − Γl − Γd)q2
( ∑
i∈{a,b}
∑
j∈{l,d}
N i,jT −N
i,j
t
)
+
∫ T
t
QudS˜u
))
exp(−γξ)
]
< 0.
Step 3: Let Y be the process defined for any t ∈ [0, T ] by Vt = − exp(−γYt). As A
L,d is a predictable
point process and the jumps of N i,j,k, i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d}, k ∈ Vj are totally inaccessible stopping
times under P0, we have
〈
N i,j,k, AL,d
〉
t
= 0 a.s. We obtain
YT = ξ and dYt =
( ∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
Z i,j,kt dN
i,j,k
t
)
+ Z S˜t dS˜t − dIt − dA˜
d
t .
Ito’s formula yields to
Za,l,kt := −
1
γ
log
(
1 +
Z˜L,a,l,kt
ULt−
)
− ℓa,lt
(
T
2
+ ΓlQt−
)
+ Γlk2,
Zb,l,kt := −
1
γ
log
(
1 +
Z˜L,b,l,kt
ULt−
)
− ℓb,lt
(
T
2
− ΓlQt−
)
+ Γlk2,
Za,d,kt := −
1
γ
log
(
1 +
Z˜L,a,d,kt
ULt−
)
− ℓa,dt
(
T
2
1νat =0 + Γ
dQt−
)
+ Γdk2,
Zb,d,kt := −
1
γ
log
(
1 +
Z˜L,b,d,kt
ULt−
)
− ℓb,dt
(
T
2
1νbt=0 − Γ
dQt−
)
+ Γdk2,
Z S˜t := −
Z˜L,St
γULt−
−Qt− ,
It :=
∫ t
0
(
h(Lr, Zr, Qr)dr −
1
γULr
dAL,cr
)
,
h(L, Zt, Qt) := h(L, Zt, Qt)−
1
2
γσ2(Z S˜t )
2,
A˜dt :=
1
γ
∑
s≤t
log
(
1−
∆AL,dt
ULt−
)
.
In particular, the last relation between A˜d and AL,d shows that ∆at ≥ 0 is independent of L ∈ A,
with at = −
A
L,d
t
UL
t−
and abusing notations slightly, ∆at = −
∆AL,dt
UL
t−
.
In order to complete the proof, we argue in the subsequent steps that Z ∈ Z and that, for t ∈ [0, T ],
AL,dt = −
∑
s≤t U
L
s−∆as = 0 so that A˜
d
t = 0 and It =
∫ t
0 H(Zr, Qr)dr where
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H(Zt, Qt) = H(Zt, Qt)−
1
2
γσ2(Z S˜t )
2.
Step 4: Since VT = −1, we get that
0 = sup
L∈A
E
L[ULT ]− V0
= sup
L∈A
E
L[ULT −M
L
T ]
= γ sup
L∈A
E
0
[
LLT
∫ T
0
ULr−(dIr − h(L, Zr, Qr)dr +
dar
γ
)
]
.
Moreover, the controls being uniformly bounded, we have
ULt ≤ −βt := Vtexp
(
− γ
(
3(T − Γl − Γd)q2(
∑
i∈{a,b}
∑
j∈{l,d}
N i,jt ) +
∫ t
0
QrdS˜r
))
< 0.
Then, using AL,d ≥ 0, UL ≤ 0 and dIt − h(L, Zt, Qt)dt ≥ 0, obtain
0 ≤ sup
L∈A
E
0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
−βr−
(
dIr − h(L, Zr, Qr)dr +
dar
γ
)]
= −E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
βr−
(
dIr −H(Zr, Qr)dr +
dar
γ
)]
.
The quantities α0,T
∫ T
0 βr−(dIr − H(Zr, Qr))dr and α0,T
∫ T
0 βr−
dar
γ
being non-negative random vari-
ables, the result follows.
Moreover, if L is such that for any (z, q) ∈ R2(#V
l+#Vd) × N we have h(L, z, q) = H(z, q), then
∫ T
0
ULr−
(
dIr − h(L, Zr, Qr)
)
dr = 0.
Therefore, supL∈A E
L[ULT ] = V0 which implies that (OC) is satisfied. Conversely, if (OC) is satisfied,
the supremum is directly attained. This provides the inclusion C ⊃ Ξ.
Step 5: As ξ satisfies Conditions (4.2) and (4.3), to prove that Z ∈ Z it is enough to show that for
some p > 0
sup
L∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
L
[
exp
(
− γ(p+ 1)Yt
)]
< +∞.
Using Hölder inequality together with the boundedness of the intensities of the N i,j,k, we have that
supL∈A E
L[|ULT |
p′+1] < +∞ for some p′ > 0. Thus
sup
L∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
L[|ULt |
p′+1] = sup
L∈A
E
L[|ULT |
p′+1] < +∞,
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because UL is a PL-negative supermartingale. The conclusion follows using again Hölder inequality,
the uniform boundedness of the intensities of the N i,j and the fact that
exp(−γYt) = U
L
t exp
(
γ
( ∫ t
0
∑
i∈{a,b}
(
T
2
ℓi,lu dN
i,l
u +
∑
κ∈K
φlat(κ)ℓi,du dN
i,d,κ
u
)
+QudSu + d
[
Q·, S·
]
u
))
.
Consequently, C ⊂ Ξ and using Step 4 we finally get C = Ξ.
Step 6: We prove here uniqueness of the representation. Let (Y0, Z), (Y
′
0 , Z
′
) ∈ R× Z be such that
ξ = Y Y0,ZT = Y
Y
′
0 ,Z
′
T . By following the lines of the verification argument in second part of the proof of
the theorem, we obtain the equality Y Y0,Zt = Y
Y
′
0 ,Z
′
t using the fact that the value of the continuation
utility of the market maker satisfies
− exp(−γY Y0,Zt ) = − exp(−γY
Y
′
0 ,Z
′
t ) = ess sup
L∈A
E
L
t
[
− exp
(
− γ(PLLT − PL
L
t + ξ)
)]
.
This in turn implies that Z i,j,kt dN
i,j,k
t = Z
′i,j,k
t dN
i,j,k
t and Z
S˜
t σ
2dt = Z
′,S
t σ
2dt = d〈Y, S〉t, t ∈ [0, T ].
Thus (Y0, Z) = (Y
′
0 , Z
′
).
We now prove the second part of Theorem 2. Let ξ = Y Y0,ZT with (Y0, Z) ∈ R × Z. We first show
that for an arbitrary set of controls L ∈ A we have JMM0 (L, ξ) ≤ − exp(−γY0) where we recall that
JMM0 (L, ξ) is such that V
MM
0 (ξ) = supL∈A J
MM
0 (L, ξ). Then we will see that this inequality is in fact
an equality when the corresponding Hamiltonian h(L, z, q) is maximized. Let us write
Y t := Y
Y0,Z
t +
∫ t
0
T
2
ℓa,lu dN
a,l
u +
∫ t
0
T
2
ℓb,lu dN
b,l
u +
∫ t
0
QudSu + d
[
Q·, S·
]
u
+
∫ t
0
T
2
ℓa,du dN
a,d,lat
u +
∫ t
0
T
2
ℓb,du dN
b,d,lat
u ,
with t ∈ [0, T ]. An application of Ito’s formula leads to
d
(
exp(−γY t)
)
= γ exp(−γY t−)

− (Qt + Z S˜t )dS˜t + (H(Zt, Qt)− h(L, Zt, Qt))dt
−
∑
(kl,kd)∈V l×Vd
∑
i∈{a,b}
γ−1


(
1− exp
(
− γ
(
Z i,l,k
l
t + ℓ
i,l
t (
T
2
+ Γl(φ(i)Qt− − ℓ
i,l
t ))
)))
dNL,i,l,k
l
t
−
∑
κ∈K
(
1−exp
(
−γ
(
Z i,d,k
d
t +ℓ
i,d
t
(T
2
φlat(κ)+Γd(φ(i)Qt−−ℓ
i,d
t )
))))
φdt (i, κ)dN
L,i,d,kd
t



.
Therefore exp(−γY .) is a P
L-local submartingale. Thanks to Condition (4.7), the uniform bounded-
ness of the intensities of the N i,j,k, i ∈ {a, b}, j ∈ {l, d}, k ∈ Vj and Hölder inequality, exp(−γY ·) is
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uniformly integrable and hence a true submartingale. Doob-Meyer decomposition gives us that
∫ ·
0
γ exp(−γY t−)

−(Qt + Z S˜t )dS˜t
−
∑
(kl,kd)∈V l×Vd
∑
i∈{a,b}
γ−1


(
1− exp
(
− γ
(
Z i,l,k
l
t + ℓ
i,l
t (
T
2
+ Γl(φ(i)Qt− − ℓ
i,l
t ))
)))
dNL,i,l,k
l
t
−
∑
κ∈K
(
1−exp
(
−γ
(
Z i,d,k
d
t +ℓ
i,d
t
(T
2
φlat(κ)+Γd(φ(i)Qt− − ℓ
i,d
t )
))))
φdt (i, κ)dN
L,i,d,kd
t




is a true martingale. Thus
JMM0 (L, ξ) = E
L
[
− exp(−γY T )
]
= − exp(−γY0)− E
L
[ ∫ T
0
γ exp(−γY t−)
(
H(Zt, Qt)− h(L, Zt, Qt)
)
dt
]
≤ − exp(−γY0).
In addition to this, the previous inequality becomes an equality if and only if L is chosen as the
maximizer of the Hamiltonian h. In that case, JMM(L, ξ) = − exp(−γY0). Finally we have that
V MM0 (ξ) = − exp(−γY0) with optimal response (L
⋆
t )t∈[0,T ] defined by (OC).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We recall that, by [4, Corollary 1.4.2], the PDE (4.15) admits a unique continuous viscosity solution
denoted by v.
Let (t0, s˜0, n¯0, n0, y0) ∈ D where D = [0, T ]×R×N
2(#V l+#Vd) ×N2(#V
l+#Vd) ×R. We consider a test
function Φ : D→ R continuously differentiable in time, twice continuously differentiable with respect
to s and y and continuous with respect to n¯ and n, such that
0 = u(t0, s˜0, n¯0, n0, y0)− Φ(t0, s˜0, n¯0, n0, y0)
= max
(t,s˜,n¯,n,y)∈D
exp
(
− η(
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
cjn¯i,j,k−y)
)(
v(t, q)− Φ(t, s˜, n¯, n, y) exp
(
η(
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
cjn¯i,j,k − y)
))
.
Therefore for all (t, s˜, n¯, n, y) ∈ D
0 ≥ v(t, q)− Φ(t, s˜, n¯, n, y) exp
(
η(
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
cjn¯i,j,k − y)
)
,
with equality at (t0, s˜0, n¯0, n0, y0). Thus
0 = v(t0, q0)−Ψ(t0, s˜0, n¯0, n0, y0)
= max
(t,n¯)∈D
(
v(t, q)−Ψ(t, n¯)
)
,
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where
Ψ(t, n¯) := Φ(t, s˜0, n¯, n0, y0) exp
(
η(
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
cjn¯i,j,k − y0)
)
.
As v is the unique viscosity solution of (4.15), it is in particular a subsolution. Thus, for any
z ∈ R2(#V
l+#Vd)+1, Ψ satisfies
0 ≥ ∂tΨ(t0, n¯0) + U
(
z, q0,L
⋆(z, q0),Ψ(t0, ·)
)
,
with q0 :=
∑
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj(n¯
b,j,k
0 − n¯
a,j,k
0 ), U is defined by (4.16) and L
⋆ is defined in Theorem 2. After
computations, we deduce that
0 ≥∂tΨ(t0, n¯0) + Ψ(t0, n¯0)
(
η
2
σ2γ
(
zS˜ + q0
)2
+
η2σ2
2
(
zS˜
)2)
+
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
λL
⋆,i,j,k
×
(
exp
(
η(zi,j,k − kcj)
)
Φ(t0, s˜0, n¯
i,j,k
0 + k, n¯
−(i,j,k)
0 , n0, y0) exp
(
η(
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
cjn¯i,j,k0 − y0)
)
−Ψ(t0, s˜0, n¯0, n0, y0)
(
1 + ηE(zi,j,k, ℓ⋆i,j(z, q0))
))
.
Dividing on both sides of the equation by exp
(
η(
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj c
jn¯i,j,k0 − y0)
)
> 0, we obtain
0 ≥ ∂tΦ(t0, s˜0, n¯0, n0, y0) + Φ0
(
η
2
σ2γ
(
zS˜ + q0
)2
+
η2σ2
2
(
zS˜
)2)
+
∑
i∈{a,b}
j∈{l,d}
∑
k∈Vj
λL
⋆,i,j,k
×
(
exp
(
η(zi,j,k − kcj)
)
Φ(t0, s˜0, n¯
i,j,k
0 + k, n¯
−(i,j)
0 , n0, y0)−Φ0
(
1 + ηE(zi,j,k,ℓ⋆i,j(z, q0))
))
,
where Φ0 := Φ(t0, s˜0, n¯0, n0, y0). Therefore, u is a viscosity subsolution of (4.13). A similar argument
holds to prove that u is also a viscosity supersolution of (4.13). Consequently, u is a viscosity solution
of (4.13). The uniqueness of u follows from an application of [16, Theorem II.3], together with the
continuity of v. Thus, we deduce that vE0 = u(0, S˜0, N¯0, N0, Y0) = v(0, Q0).
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